Nagarjuna's Negative Dialectic and the Significance of Emptiness by Alan Gullette

Here is yet another wonderful essay from Allen Gullette composed by him for one of his college classes in Philosophy back in 1975. Brilliant, as always, and very interesting and informative indeed! This one pertains to the Buddhist concept of "Emptiness", a very important concept in All spiritual doctrines containing the One Truth. I am sure that you will have a decent grasp of this State of Being after a careful study of Mr. Gullette's clear analysis. I sincerely hope you enjoy this intelligently written essay as much as I do!

Namaste'

Nagarjuna's Negative Dialectic

And the Significance of Emptiness

Alan Gullette

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Winter 1975

Philosophy 3660: Buddhism

Dr. Lee

Of the two great schools in Buddhism, the Hinayana and the Mahayana, the latter is divided into two major systems of thought, of which the Madhyamika predominates. As the Mahayana school is the more widespread school that has evolved from Buddha's original Order, so is the body of underlying principles of the Madhyamika system of considerable importance in relation to other doctrines. Apart from this distinction, it is considered to embody the central philosophy of Buddhism and so created a revolution in that religion which carried over, in its influence, into the whole of Indian philosophical thought (Murti, vii – see Bibliography; citations are given in parentheses within the text of this paper). I will discuss the negative dialectic process of Nagarjuna (AD 200), the founder of Madhyamika, in order to clarify the doctrine of Emptiness (sunyata).

Beyond what is given in the selective basic secondary Buddhist texts of Ch'en, de Bary, Robinson, and Conze, there is actually little that need be said of the dialectic "apparatus" and the significance of the doctrine of Emptiness. For these texts offer a very good basic understanding of the doctrine, though they do not go into much detail. But while Ch'en is precise in his excellent summary and de Bary is revealing in his very clear explication, Conze and Robinson, especially the former, seem to have no deep understanding of the doctrine, failing to see all of the considerable implications of the statement of Emptiness. Nevertheless, I shall rely as much as possible upon readings from Bapat, Koller, Murti, Raju, Stcherbatsky, and Streng.

Nagarjuna's central work was the Madhyamika-karika, considered to be a masterpiece as it systematically presents the philosophy of the Madhyamika school (Bapat, 106). His fundamentals are set forth in the invocation or dedication: that "There is neither origination nor cessation, neither origination nor cessation, neither permanence nor impermanence, neither unity nor diversity, neither coming-in nor going-out in the law of Pratitya-samutpada" (or dependent arising, dependently-coordinating-origination, etc.)(Bapat, 107). This is Buddha's "principle of relativity" or svabhava-sunyata [(the emptiness of self-being)], which is to say that everything is relative [and nothing absolute]. Starting from this point, Nagarjuna set out to prove that no conceptual system can hold absolutely true. This he did by first accepting the various concepts and propositions of the various opposing schools of thought current in his day, and using the standard rules of formal debate, arrived at contradictions in all of the systems. The consistency with which he was able to do this, and the sheer brilliance of his dialect mind, has impressed many scholars who set out to study his "dialectic apparatus" or method. His dialectic skill has never been surpassed (Raju, 127).

In more specific terms, Nagarjuna took causality – the basis not only of Buddhism but also very much the basis of all scientific thought – and reduced ad absurdum both our conception of the causal law and all realistic theories. That is, by holding that there exist no separate, distinguishable real things or elements (dharmas), he threw causality out the window. All relationships are thus seen to be false. If a contradiction was seen to exist in a system, a proof of error was thereby found (Ch'en, 74). He sat about applying his results to each and every item of the Hinayanist philosophical system (Stcherbatsky, 48). By taking logical argument as his tool, Monism removed the possibility of knowing Truth conceptually through demonstrating the absurdity of conceptualizing about what is real. Beginning with the premise that systems of rations thought based on any absolute and definite statement of reality lead only to self-contradiction, he proved the illogic of a rational approach to Truth. By taking rational thought – the only common sense – that can exist between people in this false world of words and names and forms (all of which are concepts) – he shows that thought is only relatively correct, is only of relative truth – is therefore false. From this we have a statement "whatsoever is relative is false, transient, and "illusory" (46).

An idea is formed of the nature of his arguments, which are very straightforward and so laconic as to require considerable study to make sense out of them. This chore of following this though becomes a delightful one, and the student is easily persuaded of the complete validity of the argument. As an example I will present a paraphrase of Chapter XIX, "An Analysis of Time (kala)," as it is the shortest, being of six verses. (The entire work, "Fundamentals of the Middle Way," is translated in prose from Streng, 183-220; Ch. XIX is on p. 205). If the present and future exist presupposing the past (i.e., if they are seen to have emerged from the past), then they must have already existed in the past. If they did not exist in the past, they could not have emerged therefrom. But if the past is not presupposed as the source of the present and future, then these latter cannot be proved to exist: therefore neither present nor future time exist. In this way, the two can be inverted; thus one would regard "highest," "lowest," and "middle," etc., or oneness and difference – i.e., by arranging the past, present and future, they are seen to be in different orders, or as all one, or as separate. A non-stationary time cannot be grasped; and a stationary time that can be grasped does not exist; yet we cannot perceive time without grasping it. Sine time is dependent on a thing (which will change, revealing time), how can it exist without a thing? No things exist apart (svabhava), so how can time become something? Thus Time does not exist.

The only notable device used in his "analyses" that can be mentioned is noted by Raju. In several cases, including the initial chapter on causality, Nagarjuna uses the "four-cornered negation" – i.e., he refutes an idea as being, as nonbeing, as both, and as neither (Raju, 127). Belief in any of the four cases is an extreme thesis and must be transcended by a higher synthesis through the dialectic method. This process, also called "The Middle Path of Eightfold Negations," is one by which the Ultimate Truth is eventually arrived at (de Bary, 191).

Now, if everything is relative, and all that is relative is false, then what Truth is there? The answer is found in the doctrine of Sunyata, Emptiness. By saying that concepts are false, the quality of Emptiness of pinpointed. Since all is false, Emptiness is in all. This is [presented as] the Absolute Truth. The truth of emptiness is the same as the unreality of all existing elements, which is to say that Samsara (the phenomenal world, existence-in-flux) is Sunyata. But Nirvana is also the Truth, and Nirvana is the same as Sunyata and Samsara (Bapat, 107). Furthermore, the Buddha-nature is the Ultimate Reality of the basis of each person, and the Buddha-nature – and Buddha himself – is empty (Koller, 167). The significance of this is great, as we shall see later. Now we may add that since Nirvana is Enlightenment, Emptiness is Enlightenment (Streng, 161f). With all of these implications, Nagarjuna cancelled the existing definitions of reality and the whole edifice of Early Buddhism was undermined and smashed." The idea of absolute would become meaningless if there is nothing to set it against or relate it to. As well, the phenomenal would cease to be if there was nothing non-phenomenal for contrast. And so, the Absolute becomes as relative as all other ultimates and is filled with Sunyata: there is no difference between the Absolute and the Phenomenal (Stcherbatsky, 45, 48). Strangely, there is no contraction here, even though Samsara, which is "false," becomes indistinct from Sunyata, which is "true." The key is in the flexibility of "real" or "true," which is being widened in its definition through these comparisons.

One paradox that seems to crop up is indicated by an argument against the Madhyamika doctrine. The argument is that Nagarjuna's arguments are themselves empty. But so is this argument against him, etc. Every logical argument can be reduced to absurdity (de Bary, 78). But Nagarjuna had made his point, and his system of thought designed to rid us of theories is not a theory itself. Nevertheless, the Sunyata or doctrine of Emptiness is certainly empty itself. Where are we left? Murti writes, "Negation is not total annulment but comprehension without abstraction" (128). The dialectic is primarily a judgment on the limitation of reason which simply clears the mind for a perception or apprehension of reality by a higher faculty – that of intuition. This intuition is perfection of wisdom or prajna (126). So the logical system of dialectics was meant to be abandoned from the beginning, which further evidences Nagarjuna's brilliance. He says that clinging to it as a false system is worse that clinging to a non-existent self. He actually shows the Emptiness of his "Treatise on Relativity" if the Relative is significant, then the non-relative surely has meaning, else the Relative would fall by having nothing to relate to. But there is nothing that exists outside of Samsara (interdependency, or relativity) if everything is relative. Therefore, Relativism itself is meaningless. What remains to use is only intuitive sensitivity to the Truth, to the Buddha, whereby we can attain Nirvana or perfection of wisdom or prajna-paramita.

Here, then, is a strong indication that meditation-yoga techniques are aids for realizing Emptiness, allowing an "ultimate indifference" to "pervade the mind, feelings, and activities of the religions student. Emptiness is an answer to the quest for enlightenment when it promotes a practical solution to the problem of sorrow" (Streng, 163). For Conze, "Wisdom is understood as a refined dialectics which kills all thought" (162). Pure consciousness – the absence of thought and perception in the mind – is achieved by an extremely high-level meditation. Dialectics means, "if you think properly and deeply on anything, you arrive at contradictions, i.e., at statements which to some extent cancel each other out" (17). What is left but Emptiness as the middle path between all extremes?

The significance of the non-difference between Nirvana and Samsara is this: Nirvana is here and now. It is all around us and in us (actually, we are in it, being of the whole), as is the Buddha-nature and Buddhahood. We need only to be awakened to it. Chinese and Japanese modifications of the Madhyamika doctrine show in their Buddhists "a frank acceptance of the beauty of the world, and especially of the beauty of nature, as a vision of Nirvana here and now" (de Bary, 78). This places Nirvana in Samsara. This realization of Nirvana does put an end to suffering and suggests a revision of the strongly Buddhist statement that "all life is suffering." For enlightenment allows one to enjoy life here and to appreciate the beauty of life. The "problem of sorrow" solved, we have hope – which is what any religion will offer us – and a clarification of Buddha's main doctrine (of suffering).

Conze notes that Sunyata was symbolized in art by an empty circle, representing absence of self or self-effacement. Now, this self-denying aspect of Buddhism – of Nirvana as a "blowing out" of the self – is disturbing to one who believes in individuality. But we have a more complete understanding of the dialectics that remove the subject-object distinction and so abolish the individual. Conze is unclear on this point: The self is certainly destroyed as a concept, but the believer in the doctrine need not efface himself to become empty. He is allowed to be amused with the illusion of self, understanding all the while that the individual only seems to exist…

Bibliography

Bapat, P. V. 2500 Years of Buddhism. India: Publications Division, 1956.

Koller, John M. Oriental Philosophies. New York: Scribner's, 1970.

Murti, T. R. V. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. London: George Allen and Unwin, second edition 1960.

Raju, P. T. The Philosophical Traditions of India. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971.

Stcherbatsky, Th. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965 reprint of Leningrad, 1927 edition.

Streng, Frederick J. Emptiness – A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville: Abindon Press, 1967.

Nothing is Sacred; Or, The Concept of Nothing in Zen by Alan Gullette

 

 

Here is another great essay by Allan Gullette that I want to share with you. I find that his grasp of the concepts in Zen as well as those of Meso-American Shamanism from Carlos Castaneda's works is right-on from my understanding and explained in such a clear and very interesting manner. Since I am still unable to type for extended periods, I will probably share more of his wonderful essays in the near future. The use and strength of my shoulder is slowly improving so I will begin to write some of my own again as soon as my endurance and comfort improves. Until then, please enjoy absorbing the concept of "Nothing" below from the Wisdom of Zen Buddhism.

Namaste' 

Nothing is Sacred; Or,

The Concept of Nothing in Zen

Alan Gullette

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Spring 1976

Religious Studies 3770: Zen Buddhism

Dr. Stan Lusby and Dr. Camp

Nothing is sacred in Zen:  it is a central theme, an essential concept in Zen thought. Yet it is not a concept, for there is no conceptualization in true Zen; and there is no Zen thought, for there is no thought in true Zen.  Nothing is, rather, something that is experienced and not merely conceptualized.  Yet nothing is no "thing" as all, for there is no "thing" to be experienced in Zen:  the experienced and the experiencer and the experiencing are all one and the same. Sunyata, emptiness, nothingness is the heart of Zen.

Sunya means empty, and emptiness (sunyata) is, in Mahayana Buddhism, a necessary and essential quality of all phenomena, as is the quality maya (illusion)(Robinson, 49).  In earliest Indian (Vedic) thought, being (sat) was considered to be "the solid, reified state of things," and nonbeing (asat) was "their subtle, unmanifest state."  Shortly before the Buddha's time, "being came to mean that which endures as against that which changes, the ground in contrast to its modifications."  But the Buddha discarded both the idea of nonbeing ("seeing how the world arises") and the idea of being ("seeing how the world perishes").  Such is the middle Path (30).

The concept of a substance or substratum that is unchanging was thus rejected, and the Buddhist position was that no substance exists apart from its modifications or particular forms.  Existence and nonexistence are only relative to each other and pertain only to the world of the conditioned – absolute (nonrelative) being was thus denied.  Still, there is nirvana, absolute reality, the unconditioned, which transcends such relative categories as existence and non-existence (31).  Nirvana is the unmanifest source, yet is not a substance at all – it is only Nothing.  Emptiness (sunyata) is not "a stuff out of which all things are," Robinson writes.  "Rather, it is the fact that no immutable substance exists and none underlies phenomena."  This emptiness is a "descriptive law," not a "substantial entity" (52).  It is nothing at all.  The world of phenomena (samsara) is a phantom that is conjured up by a phantom (maya).  "These phantoms exist" only "insofar as they appear and act, but inexist insofar as they are insubstantial and impermanent."  Nirvana is changeless, permanent, yet not "substantial in any sense.  It is  dependent coarising, sunyata, that is the process of change" (52). Emptiness of all things is the fact of Nirvana, which is itself nothing.

Here we must carefully distinguish between terms. Nonbeing and being are dialectically interdependent, relative terms.  Nothing has usually been confused in the West with nonbeing, though in the east it is seen differently. Nonbeing is "parasitic" on being; it is a negative term deriving its meaning from the positive.  But in the east, nothing is what gives meaning to the positive in the first place, as we shall see later.  Absolute nothingness is what is meant by "nothing" or "nothingness" or "no-thingness." (Although the latter term is somewhat derivative from the idea of "thing" and "thingness," I use it only because I am used to thinking of things, and like most westerners I can best understand Nothing in relative terms, all the while keeping in mind that this is not an exact understanding – but only an experiential understanding is a true one, so that all conceptual understanding is necessarily inexact.)  Absolute nothingness is thus distinct from relative nothingness or mere nonbeing (which is, again, parasitic).  Thus the westerner Paul Tillich understands nothing only as derivative nonbeing:

Nonbeing is dependent on the being it negates…. The ontological status of nonbeing as nonbeing is dependent on being.  The character of the negation of being is determined by that in being which is negated. (40)

Yet we must allow that not all of our sources use these terms strictly, and it is necessary to understand what is meant by their terms.  For instance, Alan Watts writes: "whether one looks longingly toward 'non-being' (wu) or cultivates 'emptiness' (sunyata), the principle involved is the same" (82).

Nothingness (wu-i-wu) is the same as emptiness (sunyata) and is true "purity" for Hui-neng.  According to D. T. Suzuki, "It is the negation of all qualities, a state of absolute non-ness" yet is not misconceived as a separate entity outside of a perceiver engaged in "the pure act of seeing." This "seeing" is quintessential To Zen.  It is satori – seeing into one's inner, true nature – and thus "seeing into the ultimate nature of things" – perceiving the true Mind.  This seeing is termed chien-hsing ("to look into the nature [of the mind]")(159-61).  Seeing is also called Prajna (wisdom), or at least seeing is with the "eye of Prajna" and Prajna is what enables one to see (178).  Prajna allows one to graspsunyata, the emptiness of all things, and is itself "knowledge of the highest order permitted to the human mind, for it is the spark of the ultimate constituent of all things."  This ultimate constituent, the sine qua non, the quintessence, ishsing or Mind (172).

 The Mind is the Buddha.  It means "no-mind-ness" (wu-hsin), and its attainment is "the ultimate end of the Buddhist life."  Mind does not belong to the categories of being and nonbeing, but "is absolute thusness" or "suchness" (tathata)(216).  Suchness is "the Body of Consciousness, and Consciousness is the Use of Suchness," according to Suzuki, though this actually says little.  Better:  "Suchness means the Absolute… formlessness… the unconditioned… Emptiness (sunyata)," and is unattainable in that it is "beyond perception, beyond grasping" for our conditioned minds.  "All our relative knowledge is concerned with dualities," but "emptiness is on the other side of being and nonbeing" (190).  Perceiving as we know it, grasping, attaining must cease, for we are already "attained."  "It is Prajna which lays its hands on emptiness, or Suchness, or Self-nature" (191) and we are all endowed with a Prajna-eye.  "Seeing into nothingness – this is true seeing and eternal seeing" (Shen-hui, in Suzuki, 191).

The relationship between sunyata and tathata, being one of identity, can be clarified: sunyata is tathata "when sunyata is awakened to itself or becomes aware of itself, which is 'knowing and seeing itself.'"  Tathata, Suchness, is "the viewing of things as they are: it is affirmation through and through" (263).

Self-nature (Buddha) is nothing in the sense that it is not a thing (165).  This is one use of "nothingness."  If a being, a thing, must be distinguished from other beings, other things –i.e., if a being only has being within all of existence, Being – then the whole of Being is not-a-being, not-a-thing, since there is nothing (in the derivative sense) to distinguish it from.  Being is, therefore, non-being or no-thing.  Furthermore, if a thing is what is experienced dualistically (i.e., as an object in contradistinction from the subject and in contradistinction from the whole of Being, from which it is singled out), then for one who experiences oneself nondualistically (i.e., as an inseparable part of All) and who experiences things likewise (as inseparable parts of the whole) – for this one, there is no thing.  This enlightened one, this Buddha, experiences Nothing – sees Suchness with the Prajna-eye.

In the world of ordinary experience every experience is conceptualized, since this world is really our intellectual reconstruction and not reality as it is in itself, not in its 'suchness'… Sunyata is experience only when it is both subject and object. (262)

As such, it is neither subject nor object, but merely is.  Tathata is Being-as-it-is, it is Self-nature, Dharma (truth), suchness and isness, and is at the same time (again) "the viewing of things as they are."  Reality is self-conscious, introspective.  When a man discovers that his mind does not really exist (as separate), then mind and ego pass away, leaving only Mind.

While in this West nothing gains meaning only through the negation of something – is parasitic and derivative –, in eastern thought it is the experience of nothing that reveals the meaning of everything.  The exception in the West is found in mystics and certain existentialists; the understanding these thinkers have of nothingness is very much like the Zen understanding in many interesting ways.  I will now examine the similarities between Martin Heidegger and Zen concerning nothing.

Vincent Vycinas, writing about Heidegger's philosophy, notes that, "Just as death is that which gives life (in the sense of existence) its fullness and makes it stick out as an organized whole, so nothingness is presupposed to give Being its framework and graspability" (quoted in Lescoe, 240).  In Heidegger, anxiety or dread (Angst) is the psychological coefficient of the experience of nothingness.  It is not fear, for fear is always of something.  Angst is rather of noting, though this nothing is "something" very real, yet not a "thing" as we understand the world.  Nothing (Nichts), for Heidegger, is prior to logical negations rather than derivative from them – it allows us to say "there is no money," "I have eaten nothing," etc.  It is also, in James Collins's words, an "anterior principle" for "our understanding of particular instances of being" (quoted in Lescoe, 239). 

According to William Richardson, Heidegger's Nichts is "Non-being… that renders possible the manifestation of beings as beings."  Egon Vieta adds: "Nothingness, being the absolute opposite of being, puts a limit on being, by isolating it and making it a unified whole" (quoted in Lescoe, 240).  It is in this sense that Nothingness is an essential part of being, necessarily intertwined with it. Besides being merely a part of Being, Nothingness is, in a sense, Being itself:  "In the state of anguish [Angst], nothingness exhibits itself to us simultaneously with the totality of being" (241).  In this experience of dread, the individual's attention is drawn to things in the world, which are seen to form a unity but which are also seen to slip away, and nothing is left to be experienced.  "Against the background of 'nothingness,' a background of horror and awe, the things in the world begin to stand out as what they actually are" and reality itself is grasped (Werner Brock, quoted in Lescoe, 242).  And so Nothingness brings the individual (Heidegger's Dasein) "face to face with what is as such" (Heidegger, in Lescoe, 242).  The parallel here is obviously with Suchness.

The relationship between Nothing and Being (Everything) is problematic.  Thinking logically, nothing cannot really exist – it must be outside of existence.  If it is to be thought of as being outside existence yet as giving Being, in effect, its being – rather than Nothing "being" derivative from Being – then it is more or less nirvana as understood by Buddhists.  Yet here we have arrived, through a process of logical thinking, at a dualism between Nothing and Being, and dualisms are not allowed in Zen thinking (even if thinking itself is allowed)!  The solution seems to lie in the equation of Nothingness and Being hinted at in the discussion of Heidegger above.  This equation is affirmed in the equation (already mentioned) of sunyata, nothingness, emptiness, with tathata or the Buddha-nature, reality, Being-as-it-is.  This equation is also found explicitly in the ideas of Nishida and the modern Kyoto school of philosophy.  But an easier solution is found simply in the negation of the problem (!) as it were: Nothing, in itself and in relation to Being, is to be understood experientially and not conceptually.  If there is a contradiction found in the concept of sunyata (in itself and in its equation to Being, as in the equation of nirvana with samsara – which is basically the same equation), then, says Suzuki, "we are out of sunyata.  As long as we live in it, there is no contradicting, and this is where Zen wants to be" (261).

Nishida Kitaro, according to Hans Waldenfels, is "the father of modern Japanese philosophy" (378).  His idea of nothing began with the concept of place (cf. Plato's topos and Aristotle's hypokeimenon).  Place (basho) is beyond being and relative nothingness (364).  It is the place of Absolute nothingness, a certain place wherein everything exists, "the substratum within which all forms become actualized" (356).  According to Takeuchi, another of the Kyoto philosophers, "the philosophy of Absolute Nothingness" is the common concern of Nishida and Tanabe (a third Kyoto thinker) – that is, " the absolute must be considered first as Absolute Nothingness" (quoted in Waldenfels, 355).

For Nishida, the starting point of a philosophy must be a "pure experience," an experiencing of things "just as they are" (356), with is tathata.  This fundamental religious experience is "the immediate realization of Absolute Nothingness" (378) and becomes the principle of a philosophical system, thus combining "eastern religious experience with western philosophical thought, mystical experience and logical structure" (373).  Absolute nothingness here takes the place of the God of mystical experience, but Nishida goes on to equate God, "the foundation of the universe," with this Nothingness:

God is absolute nothingness (mattaku mu).  However, if one says that God is merely nothingness (tan ni mu), this is certainly not so.  At the base of the establishment of reality there is the unifying function which clearly cannot be moved. … God… is the basis of reality, and only because He is able to be Nothingness, is there no place whatsoever where He is not. (357-8)

Nishida resorts to some interesting terminology in delineating his idea of the absolute.  "That which is called the true Absolute, must… be self-identical in an absolutely contradictory manner.  When we express God in a logical manner, there is no other way to say it than this" (378).  For "the final experience of the Absolute is… beyond any philosophical expression, and, therefore, is the 'absolute contradictory self-identity.'"  Absolute Nothingness is "unity of opposites," is "(absolute) contradictory self-identity," is "identity of self-contradictories" (369, 362).  Nishida develop this single idea in examining the relationship between self and world.  The concept wasused to probe the problems of a philosophy of religions:  the contradictions of man's existence, where the satisfaction of desire means the extinction of desire and the will makes it s own extinction its object… In these problems religion is established, for in the awareness of the absolute contradictoriness and nothingness of the self-existence we first touch the absolute and God. (Edwards, 519)

The experience of nothingness for Nishida is satori for Zen.  Itsprings from your laboring thinking, and you find 'satori,' enlightenment.  The Universe has being nothing, and the Ego has become nothing.  But in the same spark of Nothingness you regain the world and yourself in wonderful self-identity.  In the experience of Nothingness, everything is as it is.  (Waldenfels, 368)

This is Prajna seeing tathata, sunyata experiencing itself in its "self-identity." Again,

In one who is really overwhelmed by the consciousness of absolute nothingness, there is neither 'Me' nor 'God,' but just because there is absolute nothingness, the mountain is mountain, and the water is water, and the being is as it is." (Waldenfels, 367)

For Tanabe, "absolute nothingness belongs to the realm of eastern religious self-realization," which "consists of seeing by being nothingness" (Waldenfels, 387).  Suzuki also speaks of being as seeing and seeing as knowing with respect to sunyata, where we are (Suzuki, 262-3).  Takeuchi, who designated absolute nothingness as "the place of encounter," asks, "How are being-itself and absolute negatively related in God or in the Absolute?"  He answers:

God is at once Being-itself and Absolute Nothingness.  It is understandable that I prefer the latter designation, because absolute nothingness as Absolute Negativity (that is, the negation of negation) at the same time implies the former, the affirmative. (Waldenfels, 388)

Suzuki also stresses that sunyata is not negative but positive, and that sunyata as tathata is obviously "an affirmation through and through" (261, 263).

God as nothing is also found in certain western mystics.  Harry Weinberg surveys this equation in the west:

As the Christian mystics state, 'God is Nothing' He is Utterly Other; He is the VOID.' Eckhart proclaims, 'Thou shalt love God as He is, a Non-God, a Non-Spirit, a Non-Person, a Non-Form.'  Tauler describes God as 'The divine darkness, the nameless, formless nothing.'  In Jewish mysticism we find frequent reference to the conception of God as Nothing.  It is when these mystics proceed to making affirmative statements about the nature of God that misevaluation occurs.  God cannot exist in the sense that we normally mean existence.  As with things, whatever we say God is, he is not. (Weinberg, 248-9)

Returning, finally, to Zen, let me quote from Huang-po and Alan Watts on nothingness, its significance, the experience of it, and its significance.  Huang-po said: "Men are afraid to forget their minds, fearing to fall through the void with nothing onto which they can cling.  They do not know that the void ids not really the void but the real realm of the Dharma" (in Watts, 141).  Watts writes that the dharmakaya (the body of the Buddha, the cosmic body of the universe, the Absolute) "is the void itself" (71).  Watts goes on to talk about Hui-neng.  In opposing the false dhyana (meditation) of mere "empty-mindedness" (the idea "that the highest state of consciousness is a consciousness empty of all contents, all ideas, feelings, and even sensations"), Hui-nengcompares the Great Void to space, and calls it great, not just because it is empty, but because it contains the sun, moon, and stars.  True dhyana is to realize that one's own nature is like space, and that thoughts and sensations come and go in the 'original mind' like birds through the sky, leaving no trace.  (93-4)

This calls to mind the famous, beautiful couplet from the Zenrin:

The wild geese do not intend to cast their reflection;

The water has no mind to receive their image.

As Watts points out, "The true mind is 'no mind' (wu-hsin), which is to say that it is not to be regarded as an object of thought or action, as if it were a thing to be grasped and controlled" (94).  That is to say, the mind is no-thing.

References

Edwards, Paul et al, eds. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  New York: Macmillan, 1967. Vol. 5.

Lescoe, Francis.  Existentialism: With or Without God.  New York: Alba House, 1974.

Robinson, Richard. The Buddhist Religion. Belmont, CA; Dickerson, 1970.

Suzuki, D. T.  Zen Buddhism. Garden City: Doubleday, 1956.  Ed., William Barrett.

Tillich, Paul.  The Courage To Be.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.

Waldenfels, Hans.  "Absolute nothingness: preliminary considerations on a central notion in the philosophy of Nishida Kitaro and the Kyoto school."  Monumenta Nipponica 21 (1966): 354-391.

Watts, Alan.  The Way of Zen.  New York: Pantheon, 1957.

Weinberg, Harry.  Levels of Knowing and Existence: Studies in General Semantics.  New York: Harper & Bros., 1959.

Bibliography

Nieda, Rokusaburo.  "'Nothing' in Zen in comparison with Christian eschatology and 'Nothing' in European philosophers."  Numen IX (1962): 37-44.

Novak, Michael.  The Experience of Nothingness.  New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Professor's Comments: Grade A.  A really superior paper, probing central Zen motifs in a substantial manner. [Dr. Camp.]



Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
Nirvana is, but not the person who enters it;
The path is, but no traveler thereon is seen.
 

The Real Color

Buddha held in his hand a crystal ball which he showed to the kings of the gods of the East, West, North and South. These gods controlled human beings. Buddha asked them, ‘what color is this ball?’ One god said blue, another said yellow, the third said red, and the fourth god said that the ball was white. All of the gods had spiritual power but they all saw different colors. Buddha put the ball in his pocket and showed the gods his empty hand. He asked them, ‘what do you see now?’ All of the gods said, ‘nothing is there.’ Buddha said, ‘You are ignorant. The real color has come and you have all said that there is nothing.’

Castaneda's Journey to Ixtlan: A Review by Alan Gullette

This is another one of the gems from Allen Gullett's essays written in one of his Philiosophy classes in the studies of Comparitive Religion and Philosophy. This is a review of "Journey to Ixtlan", the third of four books comprising The Teachings of don Juan: A Yaqui Indian Sorceror. Being more of a review than the essay in my previous post, it nevertheless contains very valuable explanations of our perceived "realities" and the Infinite "canvas" of true Reality upon which we "paint" our "picture of reality". Since the vast majority of people have been wrongly told and wrongly believe that sorcerors are "evil", they need only to review the "miracles" that Jesus performed and imagine being there, superstitious and vastly ignorant, witnessing some stranger magically turning water into wine or feeding multitudes with a few fish and a few loaves of bread. It is all the same. Indeed, if anyone did this in 1600's Salem, MA, he would surely have been hung as a "magic witch" or "warlock"! And yes, witches were hung, not burned at the stake. Now with that adulteration of mind out of the way, enjoy the wonderful essay below containing the Wisdom of a Meso-American Man of Knowledge teaching the One Truth.

Namaste'

Note: Reference points pertain to the book.

Castaneda's Journey to Ixtlan

by

Alan Gullette

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Winter 1979 (2/20/79)

Religious Studies 3011: Phenomenology of Religion

Dr. Jay Kim

This is Castaneda's third volume on his experiences with Yaqui sorcerer don Juan Matus (and company).  The key concept is seeing, which is don Juan's version of the living, growing mystical experience of life in which there is true perception of realty and of oneself (in relationship to that reality)(etc.).  In don Juan's particular terminology, seeing involves stopping the world – or the interruption of the constant flow of interpretation (internal dialog) that creates our (phenomenal) world through description in accordance with the belief system which we have been taught since childhood.  This description/projection of the world as we know it involves particular conceptions of the things of the world, and the self-concept seems to be an important (but often overlooked) part of the picture.  People who live in such a closed world in which there is almost no self-awareness (or any attempt to either corroborate or invalidate the belief in a "self" by openly observing the fact) are called "phantoms" by those (such as don Juan and don Genaro) who are not trapped by the world.  To be able to untrap oneself, or collapse the world, one first has to question the worldview that has been assumed all along to be reality itself.  For don Juan, this is accomplished by learning a different description or away of perceiving the world (the sorcerer's description).  When one's conviction in one's very own "reality" (world-construct including self-conception) is shaken, it is hoped that one will catch a glimpse of the fact, the truth, the actually real world that is there beyond our projections.  This is what don Juan calls seeing.  Don Juan's sole concern is to help Castaneda through this process, and various techniques are taught to aid in stopping the world.  There is something of a progression in the experiences Castaneda has when he is with don Juan, and don Juan unfolds the sorcerer's description in the lessons he draws from these experiences (which he takes at least some part in creating).  I will discuss these experiences, lessons, and techniques, together with the development of Castaneda's understanding, in terms of seeing.

Insofar as don Juan intends almost all along to initiate Castaneda into "the path of knowledge" (which leads to seeing, not as an end but as a beginning), their entire relationship is pertinent to the study of mysticism.  At first, Castaneda does not really have much of a purpose in life – he is an anthropology student interested in the ritual use of psychotropic plants among Indians.  In asking don Juan to teach him about these plants and their use, he doesn't know what he's getting himself into!  Don Juan's whole approach to Castaneda is very subtly geared toward helping him open up to what is real, and as such the program is tailor-made and, as one can appreciate more in Tales of Power (Castaneda's fourth book), is a work of considerable genius.  In the course of mystifying and horrifying experiences, Castaneda becomes dependent on don Juan as a teacher and guide, as well as becoming aware that don Juan is a rare and very real individual.

Don Juan's "lessons" take place in the field.  They are not intellectual or academic (despite Castaneda's note-taking), but are geared to awaken a part of the human being that is dormant – namely, the body, which has an innate intelligence (will) apart from the intellect (reason).   In the course of these lessons, the sorcerer's worldview is revealed.  The basic premise of the view concerns views:  "the world of everyday life is not real, or out there, as we believe it is" but is merely a description, a view (viii).  Therefore, plants are not "just" plants but are sensitive and might become malevolent if we are ungrateful fro their generosity (6, 25).  Likewise, crows become more than "just" crows but are also omens, giving important indications for those to whom they are friendly (19-20, 49).  And there are other ways (than crows) that a man can get "agreements from the world" – the wind in the leaves, a falling rock, a jet flying over, the "comments" of a coffee percolator, etc. (6-8).  In thinking that the world is only the way we think it is (which is arrogant and involves self-importance), we prevent ourselves from appreciating the vastness and awesomeness of life and of ourselves.  IN fact, the self-concept is evidently a very important part of the world-construct.  In erasing or dropping personal history, one frees oneself from the encumbering thoughts of others who, purposefully or not, seek to contain one in the conception they have of one (11-16).  One is not one's name, national origin, past history; one is the world about oneself at any moment – i.e., one is mysterious, unknowable, unpredictable, always new (14).  The new self-concept that don Juan teaches Castaneda is that of the "hunter" or "warrior."

The anxiety that Castaneda seems to habitually experience is probably related to death, which makes a reflection on the impermanence (thus, vitality) of the self.  The warrior is aware of his own death as a presence that he uses as an "advisor."  Facing the fact of one's death, one begins to see all things as equal, for nothing matters outside of death's touch.  This requires one to assume responsibility for one's actions and decisions – for each act might result in death.  As each act could be the last, the warrior rids his life of pettiness and focuses his attention on the present moment.  Impeccable, he does his best in whatever he does:  he is tremendously aware of the finality, the serious actuality of his engagements.  Castaneda is definitely not a warrior: he frets and moans, doesn't want to think about death, doesn't assume responsibility for himself.  He often feels that the path of the warrior is too arduous for him.

In the course of their activities in the desert, Castaneda experiences intense fear as well as exquisite well-being.  The fear is not only for physical safety but is also a supernatural fear, as when he encounters "allies" and other forces.  Once, he his so afraid that his thoughts cease and fear is purely a physical sensation, which is unusual for him (175).  When lying on a "bed of strings" which d don Juan made for him, he experiences "quietness, an exquisite sense of well-being," in which thought also stops (148).  This experiences borders on the mystical.

Not-doing is a mode of relating and perceiving in which the body becomes more sensitive to its surroundings.  One technique is to focus on the shadows of the leaves on a tree (rather than the leaves and branches themselves) until they are perceived in a gestalt-like whole.  The sorcerer learns much from shadow-gazing.  Castaneda practices not-doing for hours on end under don Juan's supervision and finds it enjoyable and relaxing.  Meandering in the desert is another form of not-doing.  Doing, on the other hand, involves relating to something as a thing – brining to gear all the knowledge one has about it within one's paradigm.

As a lesson in the power of interpretation, don Juan appears to Castaneda and four other sorcerer's apprentices in such a way that each of them describes his dress and manner in a completely different way.  They are, of course, mystified when they share their descriptions (207-8).  Another time, don Juan and don Genaro make Castaneda's car "disappear" and then "reappear" in a different place (though it never "really" moved).  don Genaro makes a kite out of his hat and it falls on the car or turns into the car – and this ambiguity indicates the insufficiency of conceptual interpretation (244).  The experience of the unexplainable forces one to question one's conviction in one's worldview.

In the next to last chapter, Castaneda goes into the mountains alone to stop the world.  Watching a dung beetle, he realizes that there are worlds upon worlds before us and that death makes him and the beetle equal in importance.  He experiences overwhelming joy and elation.  A coyote comes along and talks to him and makes his mind "wobble;" the animal turns into an iridescent being, but Castaneda thinks that this is a projection form the memory of his first peyote experience.  Then he has what is surely a mystical experience, "a state of ecstasy for what appeared to be an endless time," etc. (252).  The talking coyote was a perception according to the sorcerer's description; the familiar world had stopped.  But the luminous being and the perception of the lines of the world, although explained by sorcerers, were apparently perceptions that were not filtered by any conceptualization or interpretation: Castaneda saw.

At the end, Castaneda realizes that he is not prepared to "meet the ally" (a magical being he is sent into the desert to meet) or accept full responsibility for his being-here (mortally)(alone)(etc.).  He has not, by the end of his volume, "achieved" the full development of his understanding; he has not arrived at the reality of the self in the real world.  This reality is not "achieved" by any doing (which merely s sustains the world-construct), but is arrived at naturally through not-doing (which stops the world).  The real world is perceived in not-doing; the real self is realized spontaneously in the not-doing of the self.  This real self is one with the world, which is the mystical state of being.

"Stopping the world" and "Not-doing" in Journey to Ixtlan

                This is just one of the many gems I have discovered while doing my research. To those of you who have read and/or studied the first four books by Carlos Castaneda, will be familiar with the terminology in this essay. This is a very well done and detailed description of the core teachings of don Juan Matus, a Yaqui Indian Man of Knowledge. This Way to the One Truth Within was derived from his ten years of studying this Meso-American Way for his doctoral thesis in Anthropology. This wonderful essay was written by Allen Gullette for his college Philosophy class. He is a brilliant, creative, and most interesting writer and musician. Enjoy!

            Namaste' 

"Stopping the world" and "Not-doing" in Journey to Ixtlan

by 

Alan Gullette

 

University of Tennessee-Knoxville

Fall 1975 (10/30/75)

Philosophy 1520

Dr. Kathy Emmett

 

The relationship between stopping the world and not-doing in Carlos Castaneda's Journey to Ixtlan^[1] is here discussed.  I will define these terms and place them properly in the overall scheme that is the philosophy and lessons of don Juan.  The interrelation of the concepts can then be shown more clearly.  In addition, I will draw parallels between the lessons and other systems of thought in an attempt to clarify points in don Juan's philosophy to my own satisfaction.

A brief summary of don Juan's philosophy follows.  We are men born into a world that we cannot possibly comprehend in its awesome totality.  We are cultural animals, and so are taught a system of beliefs in a process of conditioning that will allow us to function properly in the society of our fellows.  This system is a world-construct, a description of the world and of reality, a paradigm of which we are members.  And so, we erroneously think we are able to describe reality – the world – accurately, thereby comprehending it (see, esp., p. ix).  Since we life in the world for only a short time, we should bring quality to our existence by seeking perfection of spirit.  This entails living "existentially," being in control of (and having power over) one's situations, and, in short, being as completely aware as possible of one's own conscious, temporary existence.  Although there are other aspects of the complete philosophy, the abbreviation of these points is sufficient in order to place the two concepts dealt with in this paper against a conceptual background and therefore demonstrate their relationship on that ground.

Don Juan's existential man seeks to relate directly to the world without the intermediary world-construct; he wants to experience the world directly without thought or language, which normally continuously reinforce the world-construct by presenting one with preconceptions taught to one since infancy.  In order to achieve this experience, one must stop thought and thus the flow of preconceptions.  Since all life is experience, then the highest quality experiences (direct experiences of the world or reality) are most desirable.  From these experiences "knowledge" is gained (cp. the wisdom gained through mystical experiences, e.g., the gyana swaroopa or "perfect experience of consciousness" in Vedanta^[2]).  Don Juan's "man of knowledge" is the idea of the existential man.  The direct experience is called seeing by don Juan.  It entails "responding to the perceptual solicitations of a world outside the description we have learned to call reality" (xiv), which requires a stopping of thought.  This experience, therefore, is very close to that of superconsciousness in Yoga or Vedanta, wherein thought ceases and the world fades away.^[3]  This state of consciousness is also seemingly akin to Zen satori, enlightenment, Buddhist samadhi, etc.

Don Juan says, "Seeing . . . is the final accomplishment of the man of knowledge, and seeing is attained only when one has stopped the world" (194).  In order to see, one must stop the world or suspend the world-construct operating on one's perceptions and experiences.  Stopping the world is "a technique by virtue of which the world as we know it is made to collapses" (104).  The world-construct, however, is necessary for life as we know it, and the man of knowledge restores it again "in order to keep on living" (136).  The term world-construct can be used interchangeably with the term world when one understands that the world is a way of looking at reality (external reality), a way of ordering experience, a grid projected onto that outside reality.  Further, the system of beliefs that comprise a world organizes experience without the use of a controlling imagery that can be called a "mythology" or body of myths.  A myth is an attempt to describe or explain reality or phenomena witnessed.^[4]

The technique of stopping the world is facilitated by simultaneous membership; the achievement of the technique can also be aided by those who have simultaneous membership.  In simultaneous membership, one description of the world is opposed to another, so that perhaps the mechanism in the mind that forces us to experience the world through a filter will be suspended or temporarily knocked-out, allowing us to see.  The alternate description is used also in order to stop the world as described by our native culture.  In seeing, "one sneaks between the worlds" and does without a world-construct for a while (254)j.  In the case of Castaneda, don Juan' teaches him the sorcerer's description.  Don Juan and don Genaro, another man of knowledge, both know this other description, and are so able to aid Castaneda in stopping the world as we know it.  This alternative description is the only other way don Juan knows to look oat the world (256).  It particulars are probably unimportant – many descriptions of the world being possible, but just one other than the "normal" is sufficient for stopping the world.  To illustrate: seeing the world as we were taught to see it is like a habit.  To break this habit, we first exchange it for another habit – one more easily controlled; here, that is seeing the world in a different way.  We see that both are only habits, and we eventually learn to see without either description.

"In order to stop the world, you must stop doing" (189).  Not-doing, or "to not do what you know how to do," is more difficult to understand that seeing(see 180).  In fact, to try to understand it is a matter of doing.  Clearly, it is easier to explain doing.  It seems to be akin to objectivity; for a rock is a rock because of doing – "because of all of the things you know how to do to it" (189).  This ties in with the preconceptions we must ignore in our direct experience of the world. Looking at the leaves of a bush as a whole, a gestalt, is doing; looking rather at the shadows of the leaves and seeing them as a whole is an exercise in not-doing(see 180-1).  Shadows are "the doors of not-doing" (195).  Not-doing is done by the body, not with the mind, which explains our difficulty in understanding it fully (180).  It would seem, then, that not-doing would be the natural thing to do, so to speak: the advanced animal body of man does it and the culturally condition mind (which is equated to the world-construct in Vedanta) is meanwhile suspended.  So it is seen already that not-doing leads to stopping the world.

It is important that without doing nothing is familiar (see 189).  If nothing is familiar, everything is new and unknown and experienced for the first time – it is unconditioned.  When you try "to figure it out, all you're really doing is trying to make the world familiar" (135).  This is doing and involves rational activity -- specifically rational or intellectual formulation of experience.^[5]  As "the world is the world because you know the doing involved in making it so," reasoning or rational explanation is an integral part of being a member (in good standing) of the world or conceptual paradigm.  Castaneda's difficulty in stopping the worldwoes to his conditioned insistence on explaining rationally the phenomena he witnesses (see 246).  This insistence prevents seeing (232).  The prevention, however, is probably indirect: explaining is doing, which prevents not-doing, which is necessary for stopping the world, the sine qua non of seeing.

Don Juan says: "The most difficult part of the warrior's way is to realize that the world is a feeling.  When one is not-doing, one is feeling the world" (193). (The warrior is the existential man striving to be a man of knowledge.)  Feeling is done with the body – it is like seeing, "responding to the perceptual solicitations of a world outside" the paradigm (xiv).  The three techniques of not-doing, stopping the world, and seeing seem to be very close in actuality; it is the difficulty of understanding them which makes them into separate stages in the process of de-conditioning to face the unconditioned.  The feeling that is the world would seem to be a single perception and not  divided among the traditionally distinguished sense organs.

Acting without belief is not-doing (see 199).  Belief, again, orders experience (see note 4) in an attempt to make it meaningful.  On the absolute level, there is no meaning; vain attribution of meaning to trivial moods and events and actions is frivolous in the light of our mortality.  The technique of not-doing is facilitated by displacement of normal doing by a different doing in a trick analogous to learning an alternative world description.  This sis the doing of strategy, in which "there are only actions" (227).  That is, there is no meaning attached to the actions.  Both doings are unreal, but are useful in attaining what the warrior hunts for: power.  (This power is like mental energy; it also allows some deliberate control over situations in reality and, to an extent, over other people, though over-emphasis of the latter leads to a loss of the power.)  In the same way, both world – the world we all know and the sorcerer's world – are unreal, but they are useful i f not necessary models of reality (200). 

Power is an important concept in don Juan's philosophy The summary given earlier of the philosophy stresses seeing.  This is interpretive.  Another, briefer sketch of the philosophy follows in which the concept of power is stressed.  With this alternative approach, not-doing and stopping the world are also seen to relate to each other.  Don Juan's existential man, the warrior, lives strategically, for he knows his life is in his own hands and he is completely free and complete responsible.  To avoid being hunted himself, he lives like a hunter, and he needs power over situations in order to carry out his strategies.  Not-doing is the first step toward accumulating power (181).  Once he has stored power, the warrior becomes a man of knowledge, and enough power will enable him to stop the word and see.  If power were analogous to psychic energy, then stores of power would allow one to raise one's awareness and control one's state of consciousness at will. Thus, one could live as fully as possible in the perfection of spirit that belongs to the man of knowledge.

Within this second sketch of don Jan's philosophy – emphasizing power, its hunting and storing – not-doing and stopping the world are also clearly related, just as in the first summary emphasizing the almost mystical experience of the unconditioned (reality) through the body (or instincts and intuition, as distinct from mind, intellect, reason, etc.).  Both interpretations indicate the worth of the model don Juan offers us.

"For me there is only the traveling on the paths that have heart, on any path that may have heart. There I travel, and the only worthwhile challenge for me is to traverse its full length. And there I travel—looking, looking, breathlessly."
~ don Juan Matus

 

Notes

 

---

^[1] Carlos Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan: The Lessons of Don Juan (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972).

^[2] Swami Vishnudevananda, The Complete Illustrated Book of Yoga (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), 318.

^[3] Several chapters of Swami Vishnudevananda's book deal with this state and its nature to great extent, as it is the very aim of Yoga and Vedanta.  The point of thought-suspension is mentioned at least on p. 349; the need to transcend the mind is dealt with on pp. 305f.

^[4] Mark Schorer, "The Necessity of Myth." In Henry Murray, ed., Myth and Mythmaking (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 354-8. Includes a discussion of belief, myth, imagery, reality, etc.; see especially 355-6.

^[5] Ibid.